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PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION IN THE EDUCATION SECTOR: 






Education is one of the most important services provided by public governments in 
almost every country worldwide. However, the most important cross-country 
observations about education – like the PISA report by the OECD or the TIMSS by the 
IEA – focus only on international benchmarks to compare the knowledge capacity of 
pupils. This article provides a general overview of the different forms of education 
providers in ten European countries. We observe the educational system in Austria, 
Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and the United 
Kingdom and point out the similarities and national distinctions in the allocation 
mechanism for primary and secondary schools as well as universities.  
 
INTRODUCTION 
Education is one of the most important services provided by public governments in 
almost every country worldwide. However, education and its indirectly linked 
expenditure – like for example school meals or the cost of school transportation – can 
be provided by public governments as well as private companies or households. 
Moreover, the expenditure for education is not only spent in the educational institutions 
themselves, because the agency and Ministry, which support the education process by 
developing curricula or generating further vocational training for teachers, are also cost-
intensive. The following table 1 provides a general overview of the different types of 
educational expenditure:  
 
Table 1: Classification of educational expenditure 
 Expenditure at schools 
and universities 
Expenditure at public 
and private institution 
Education  Public schools Curricula developed by the Ministry 
of Education 
Private schools without any 
subsidies by public 
governments 
Further vocational training of teachers 
financed by private foundations 
Private schools financed by fees 
and public governments 
Evaluation, which grads the teaching 
ability of professors, financed by 
public and private institutions 
Research University research funded by 
public governments 
Research to strengthen the teaching 
ability by the Ministry of Education 
University research funded by 
companies or private 
foundations 
Research to optimise the class 
schedule by private companies 
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University research funded by 
public and private institution 
Research to ease the integration of 
foreign children founded by public 




Maintenance of school 
buildings by public 
governments 
Voluntary school meals offered by 
public governments 
Sports activities or ancillary 
services provided by private 
clubs 
Student grants for apartments and 
further living costs founded by private 
foundations 
Public-Private-Partnerships at 
the new building of schools 
School transportation organized by 
private companies, which were paid 
by public governments 
Source: own illustration 
 
In the United States of America or Canada private institutions are a major source to 
finance educational expenditure. In Europe the impact of private institutions on the 
education sector is lower compared to the USA and Canada. In the majority of all 
European countries the pupils attend public schools, except in Belgium, where over 54 
% of all pupils in the primary and secondary schools go to private schools. However, all 
private Belgian schools are also mainly funded by the government. The following figure 
1 presents a summary of the school landscape – as a distribution between private and 
public schools - in ten European countries in the school year of 2006 / 2007:  
 
Figure 1: Distribution of pupils in the secondary and primary schools according to 
the institution type, who attended school in the school year of 2006 /2007  
Source: own calculation based on various data from Eurydice and the national 
Federal Statistical Offices 
The total public expenditure on education related to the Gross Domestic Product (GDP), 
which can be observed in the following figure 2, varies between 4.2 % in Spain and 8.3 
% in Denmark: 
 











public schools Government-dependent private schools 
independet private schools total private schools
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Figure 2: Total public expenditure on education as a percentage of GDP in 2005 
 
Source: own illustration based on OECD, 2008, page 226. 
A number of professionals in the public administrations or politically interested groups 
opine quite often that a higher educational output can only be received by means of a 
higher concentration of expenditure on the education system. However, the empirical 
observations do not underline such an absolute argumentation, because additional funds 
available to an existing education system of a country have not improved the pupil 
performance in a sustainable manner (see Gundlach, Gmelin and Wößmann, 2001; 
Hanushek, 2003; Krueger, 2003; Wößmann and West, 2006). Furthermore, pupils from 
a country with a significantly higher level of educational expenditure or smaller class 
sizes than other countries are not necessarily in a better condition in an international 
comparison (see Wößmann, 2003). In fact, the actual research suggests that about two-
thirds of the variation in student achievement is the product of home environments, not 
schools. Therefore, the following table 2 summarizes some of the empirical research 
about the factors that affected the education output: 
Table 2: Survey of some empirical research results of factors, which affect the 
education output  
Factor Empirical result Literature 




background of the pupil 
Pupils with academic 
parents and high number of 
available books at home 
reach better performance 
than pupils from blue collar 
families and a lower number 
of books  
Entwilse, Alexander and 
Olson, 1997; Cameron / 
Heckmann, 2001; Albouy / 
Waneck, 2003, Plug, 2004; 
Schütz, Ursprung and 
Wößmann, 2008; Schütz / 
Wößmann, 2005  
Pupils from immigrants   Pupil with a migration 
background poll badly, 
however the main reason for 
this circumstance can be 
found in their socio-
economic background  
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Factor Empirical result Literature 
Gender of the pupil Female pupils have a better 
reading performance than 
male pupils, while male 
pupils in general perform  
better in Mathematic and 
Natural Science than female 
pupils  
Fuchs / Wößmann, 2007 
Equipment and personal 
resources of the school 
  
Total expenditure per pupil  No significant effects on the 
pupil performance 
Hanushek, 2003  
Class sizes No significant effects on the 
pupil performance 
Meuret, 2001; Hanushek, 
2003; Wößmann, 2003  
Class sizes and teacher 
salaries as well as teacher 
qualifications 
Positive effects on the pupil 
performance 
Hedges et al, 1994; Sutton 
and Soderstrom 1999; 
McNeal, 1997 
Ratio of computers per 
pupil  
No significant effects on the 
pupil performance 
Fuchs / Wößmann, 2004 
General teaching materials  Textbooks and construction 
materials have the highest 
impact of all education 
utilities on pupils' 
performance 
Pritchett / Filmer, 1999; 
Fuchs / Wößmann, 2007 
Institutional environment    
Infantile education / 
preschool  
Positive effect on the pupil 
performance, especially on 
pupils with a migration 
background  
Currie, 2001; Cunha, 
Heckman, Lochner and 
Masterov, 2005 
Ratio of trade union 
members per total number 
of teachers  




private and public, state run 
schools  
Positive effect on the pupil 
performance 
Neal, 2002; Hoxby, 2003 
Source: Own illustration  
For this reason, the education system of a country can be improved not only by the 
additional allocation of finances, but rather the accountability in the educational sector 
is one of the key factors. However, accountability in the framework of education is a 
highly intricate concept and we try to simplify the different interactions and players in 
the following figure 3 in which the consumers provide their preferences of elected and 
non-elected institutions. These institutions try to reproduce the wishes to the providers 
of the education and “constrict” the work of the providers of education by regulation 
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Source:  Author, 2009. 
 
EDUCATIONAL EXPENDITURE ASSIGNMENTS BETWEEN THE 
DIFFERENT TIERS OF GOVERNMENT 
Decentralisation of education is one possibility to strengthen the accountability and to 
produce some positive incentives for all actors in the education process. Education 
decentralisation can be classified as follows:
2
 
• Education deconcentration, Deconcentration describes the situation in which the 
central ministry of education shifts some responsibility to their own regional or local 
offices, but these offices are still a part of the central administration. In Germany the 
states are the major decision-makers for primary and secondary schools and every 
state has its own regulation concerning the maximum number of pupils for a class. 
However, the final decision of whether an additional class will be offered at a school 
belongs to the local educational administration (staatliche Schulämter) and the 
school itself can only file an application for a further class. 
• Education devolution, Devolution includes the transfer of responsibility from the 
central government to an independent and elected tier of government like states and 
provinces or even local authorities. This form of educational decentralisation can be 
observed in Belgium and Spain, where the central government has shifted major 
responsibility in the secondary and primary system to the Belgian language 
communities and the Spanish Autonomous Communities. 
• Education delegation, Delegation means that one tier of government has shifted the 
decision-making responsibility to the school, but de jure this responsibility still 
belongs to this tier of government. A practical example is the Danish primary school 
system where some municipalities have delegated the responsibility to their 
respective schools, but the Danish municipalities can reclaim their rights in this 
respect at any time.   
A huge number of possible educational functions and areas exists, which can be 





(Ministry of Education, 
local education authority) 
Consumer 
of education
(pupils and their parents)
Provider of education
(compulsory schools, universities,
and vocational schools) 
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construction and maintenance, the evaluation of the performance of the schools as well 
as universities, examination and degree of supervision of a school head, faculty dean or 
university president and finally the structure and organisation of the schools and 
universities itself. Moreover, in some European countries, like Belgium, Spain or 
Switzerland, the question of the official teaching languages is a very hot “political 
potato”, while in Denmark and Italy with their small German-speaking minorities as 
well as the Danish minority in the northern German state of Schleswig-Holstein, the 
teaching language plays only minor role. In Europe, the curriculum and the teaching 
methods are in mainly fixed by the central ministry of Education and their respective 
regional offices and only the subnational governments of Belgium, Germany and Spain 
posses an independent in this area. Finally, as a matter of fact it is also possible to 
decentralise the financing of education from the central government to the subnational 
and local authorities. Under the goal of strengthening the accountability, 
decentralisation of the financing of the educational expenditure is reasonable, because 
on the one hand the school providers have to consider the preferences of the citizens and 
clients and on the other hand the educational providers are not influenced by the central 
government and can make their decisions quite independently. Nevertheless, “over-
decentralisation” also has negative impacts (see Werner, Guihéry and Djukic, 2006) and 
especially universities generate huge education spill-over, which are not redundant.     
In many Western European countries, local authorities play a significant part in the 
provision of compulsory education. This participation is the result of different levels of 
autonomy in every country and the different kinds of schools considered. 
A group of certain local authorities – mainly in the Nordic countries and in the United 
Kingdom – themselves undertake the funding of schools and determine the amount of 
funds, which are used for education. These local authorities use their own tax revenues 
as well as vertical government transfers to provide primary and secondary education. In 
other countries, the educational expenditure is fixed at a higher government level, but 
the local authority may – or must – supplement it with its own resources. In a third 
group, the budget volume for education is determined and financed completely by 
higher tiers of government, but the local governments can decide how this fixed budget 
is distributed between the different forms of schools as well as between equal school 
forms. These three forms of classification can be observed in the field of teacher 
salaries, in the maintenance and construction of new schools as well as in the necessary 
equipment for schools.  
A further classification, based on the level of autonomy and the highest level of 
government which participates in the education system, can also be used to characterise 
the European education landscape. While the British and Scandinavian local authorities 
consider about huge autonomy, the local authorities in Germany, Spain, France, Italy 
and Austria are only responsible for the operational resources and the school buildings. 
However, in this second group of these five European countries the local authorities are 
not responsible for the salaries of the teachers, and in Italy and Spain are the local 
authorities are not completely responsible for the equipment and the operational 
resources in the schools.   
Belgium and Switzerland can be placed into a third group, because on the one hand the 
complete education finances of the primary and secondary schools are shifted from the 
central government to the respective regional governments.
3
 However, the 26 Swiss 
cantons and the three Belgian (speaking) communities empower their local authorities 
with different forms of autonomy and therefore both countries can be described as a 
huge “tangled web”. For example, the Canton of Schwyz claims a tuition fee for 
  
International Public Management Review  ·  electronic Journal at http://www.ipmr.net 
Volume 10  ·  Issue 2  ·  2009  ·  © International Public Management Network 
7 
 
secondary schools, while the parents in the canton of Zurich do not have to pay such a 
school fee. Moreover, the municipalities in the Canton of Schwyz are able to pay higher 
salaries at the primary schools to attract highly qualified teachers, whereas in the canton 
of Zurich such a “salary competition” does not exist. 
The following tables 3 and 4 summarise the different education assignments and 
financial responsibilities for the universities, the secondary schools and primary schools 
regarding the teacher salaries, the maintenance and the construction of new educational 
institutions as well as the necessary equipment for education between the respective 
tiers of government:  
 
Table 3: Financial responsibility of education between the different tiers of 
government 
















          
central X X X X X X    
regional       X    
local        X X 
Belgium
5
          
central          
regional X X X X   X   
upper-local     X    X  
lower-local     X  X  X  X 
Denmark 
6
          
central X X X       
upper-local          
lower-local     X   X  X  X  X  X  
France          
central X X X X   X   
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upper-local     X X    
lower-local        X X 
Germany 
7
          
central  X X       
regional X X X X  X X  X 
upper-local     X   X  
lower-local           
Italy 
8
          
central X 
X  
X X    X   
regional      X    
upper-local     X   X X 
lower-local          
Spain          
central X X X       
regional X X X X X X X X  
upper-local          
lower-local         X 
Sweden          
central X X X       
upper-local          
lower-local     X X X X X X 
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Switzerland          
central X X X       
regional    X X X X   
local     X X X X X 
UK          
central X X X       
upper-local          
lower-local    X X X X X X 
Source: own illustration 
 
Table 4: Content and administration responsibility for schools between the 




















Austria        
National MoE X X X   
 
 
Regional MoE     X X X  
Local education a.     (X) (X) X 
School (board)  (X)     (X) 
Belgium        
National MoE        
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Regional MoE  X  X X X X X 
Local education a.        
School (board)  X      
Denmark        
National MoE X  (X)   EVA9  
Regional MoE         
Local education a.   X    X 
School (board)  X X X X  X 
France        





Regional MoE         
Local education a.       X 
School (board)  X      
Germany        
National MoE   X     
Regional MoE  X (X)  X X X (X) 
Local education a.      X X 
School (board)  X     (X) 
Italy        
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Regional MoE         
Local education a.     X  X 
School (board)        
Spain        
National MoE (X)  X   X  
Regional MoE  X   X X X X 
Local education a.        
School (board)  X     X 
Sweden        
National MoE X     NAE12  
Regional MoE         
Local education a.      (X)  
School (board)  X X X X X X 
Switzerland        
National MoE        
Regional MoE  X X X X X  (X) 
Local education a.      X X 
School (board)  (X)     (X) 
UK        
National MoE X  X   Ofsted13 
 
Regional MoE         
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Local education a.     X (X)  
School (board) (X) X  X   X 
MoE = Ministry of Education ; a. = administration; Source: own illustration 
 
THE FINANCING OF EDUCATION PROVIDERS AND THE DIFFERENT 
ALLOCATION MECHANISMS 
Grants and transfers from national to subnational governments or from subnational 
governments to local authorities exist in federal as well as unitary countries. However, 
the characteristics of these conceptions differ between the countries and are mainly 
influenced by the geographical, cultural and political circumstances. The following 
figure 4 summarises the different considerations of educational costs in the ten 
European countries: 
 
Figure 4: Consideration of educational costs in the respective intergovernmental 



















Consideration of the education costs 
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The expenditures for education are not only spent in the educational institutions for 
recurrent expenses, capital investments, specific purposes and research, because the 
respective national education ministry and its regional and local administration bodies 
are also cost-intensive. Additionally, the indirect costs of education like the funding 
provided to students or their families by means of tax benefits, scholarships and 
subsidised loans to defray or delay the cost of tuition fees or living costs are also not 
redundant. However, in this section we only describe the different forms of allocation 
mechanisms for universities and highlight some similarities and differences for 
education providers at primary and secondary schools.  
The political decision-makers have the following options to finance the universities: 
• Earmarked grant based funding, The ministry of education shifts earmarked funds 
to a small number of universities or just even one university for a specific purpose. 
A handicap of grants for special purposes or earmarked grants is that they excluded 
per definition some universities and the grant receiving university is limited in its 
autonomy, because the university is only able to spend the fund on projects with are 
covered by the goal of the grant. In Italy the central government and the province of 
Bozen-Southern Tyrol have arranged special treatments for the University of Bozen, 
because it is a trilingual university and the province is dominated by a German-
speaking majority.  
• Block grant based funding, The ministry of education transfers to each university or 
to an assembly of all universities a single block grant. A huge advantage of this 
form of funding is that the universities receive more flexibility and autonomy to 
launch their “own” funds, but if the amount of the block grant is not determined by a 
transparent formula but rather by political goals, the danger of political pork 
barreling is omnipresent. An interesting solution to avoid such political pork 
barreling exists in England with the Higher Education Funding Council for England 
(HEFCE). The HEFCE was founded in 1992 and is not part of the central 
government or one of its departments. Therefore the HEFCE works within a policy 
framework set by the Secretary of State for Education and Skills, but is not part of 
the Department for Education and Skills (DfES). After receiving a block grant from 
the central government the HEFCE distributes by its independent decision the funds 
to 87 universities and 45 specialist institutions and general colleges in England. 
• Formula based funding, The ministry of education allocates the funds to the 
university based on a general formula. The factors of these formulas can be input-
orientated – like the number of enrolled students at the universities, the number of 
employed staff at the universities or the salary amount of the university staff – or 
output-orientated, e.g. the number of students who are completing a university 
degree or the number of research publications in referred journals. In Switzerland, 
the central government uses input-orientated factors for its formula to determine its 
basic subsidies to the universities as well as the horizontal, inter-cantonal education 
equalisation system. The respective formulas mainly consider the number of 
enrolled students for the legal duration of their studies at each university and weigh 
the academic disciplines differently, e.g. a PhD student has more weight than a 
bachelor student and a physics student has more weight than a business 
administration student. An output-orientated formula based funding can be found in 
Denmark. In 1994 the taximeter model was used for the university for the first time 
and the Danish tertiary education institutions do not receive any funds for students 
who do not take exams or who fail their exams.
14
 Using such an allocation 
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mechanism, the taximeter model creates such positive incentives for the universities 
to reduce the duration of study and the dropout rates of the students. But on the 
other hand, a strict teaching quality control is necessary, because for a faculty or 
university it is now attractive to lower the work effort or to shift the failed student 
just to the lowest mark for passing the exam.   
• Contract based funding, The ministry of education distributes the funds to the 
universities based on a contract. The contract includes general goals and a very 
detailed description for the universities and can be input or output-orientated. 
Moreover, in contracts with a medium or long term duration it is possible to 
incorporate some penalties if one of the contract party does not comply with the 
contract; e.g. the central government can hold back or even cut the funds in a three-
year contract, if the university does not uphold the contract. A perennial contract 
based funding provides the universities with planning reliability and fund autonomy 
as long as they receive the goals and on the other hand the ministry of education is 
able to control and, if necessary, to punish the universities. In France the ministry of 
education accredits all degree programmes of the universities. Since 1989 the 
universities have had to renew their accreditation every four years and the ministry 
of education uses this procedure to evaluate the university and conclude individual 
contracts with each university. Indeed the funds of the contracts from the central 
government are not that important like the salary of university staff or the subsidies 
for the maintenance of the buildings, but the French universities take these 
reaccreditations very seriously. In Austria the central government concludes with 
every university an individual performance agreement (Leistungsvertrag) for a term 
of three years. The university develops the draft of the performance agreement, 
which can be negotiated between the university and the ministry of education. 
Compared to France, the Austrian contract funding is very embarrassing, because 
with the new three year period starting in 2007 nearly 80 % of the transfers from the 
central government to the university are determined by the contract. Furthermore, 
the Austrian ministry of education has implemented a strict funds reduction if the 
universities default.  
• Competitive funds (mainly for research expenditure) based funding, The ministry of 
education announces a tender of funds and the universities submit their proposal for 
receiving the funds. The competitive element of this allocative mechanism is that 
not every proposal of the university can be fulfilled and based on the evaluated 
ranking – this ranking can be arranged by the ministry of education itself or an 
independent evaluation institution – only a minority of universities or even one 
university receive the funds. Competitive funds are mainly used for funds regarding 
the research of universities in Europe. Since 1951 in Germany the German Research 
Foundation (DFG – Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft) has existed and it is funded 
by the central government and 16 states.
15
 Every university, faculty or even an 
academic person can submit their proposal for research funding to the DFG and the 
DFG rejects or approves the proposal. The politicians of the central government and 
the states are represented in all decision-making bodies, whereas scientists and 
academics hold the majority on the DFG boards. Fairly similar institutions to the 
German DFG are the Austrian Science Fund (FWF), the Swiss National Science 
Foundation (SNF), the Belgian National Fund for Scientific Research (FNRS), the 
Spanish Office for Science and Technology (OCYT), the Italian National Research 
Council (CNR), the French National Scientific Research Centre (CNRS), the Danish 
National Research Foundation (Grundforskningsfonden) and the Swedish Research 
  
International Public Management Review  ·  electronic Journal at http://www.ipmr.net 
Volume 10  ·  Issue 2  ·  2009  ·  © International Public Management Network 
15 
 
Council (Vetenskapsrådet). In the United Kingdom no single institution exists which 
includes research funding of all relevant scientific disciplines; rather, a number of 
different public research funding institutions can be found and the most important 
are the Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC), the Engineering and 
Physical Sciences Research Council (EPSRC) and the Medical Research Council 
(MRC). 
• Registration fee based funding, A further option for the ministry of finance is that 
universities obtain the permission to ask the students for a registration fee or even 
general tuition fees. In Europe a tuition fees free study is a “holy cow”, because in 
some countries – namely in France and in the Scandinavian countries – free 
education access is the goal of the politicians as well the majority of the voters. The 
supporters of the idea to avoid tuition fees believe that education is a public good 
and tuition fees will prevent potential students from blue-collar families from 
embarking on a university career and only students from rich families will be able to 
go into higher education. It is undoubtedly true that tertiary education has a positive 
impact on a nation’s economy and therefore a complete private university system is 
not reasonable. However, the policy of banning tuition fees, which was practised in 
Germany and France over decades, has not generated a higher portion of students 
from blue-collar families in the universities compared to countries with tuition fees. 
The United Kingdom introduced tuition fees in 1998 and Austria, Spain and Italy 
and Portugal have since followed suit. In Germany with the strong position of the 16 
states in all education affairs the situation exists that some states have recently 
introduced tuition fees while the majority of the states still forbid the universities to 
use such a revenue source from the direct education consumer.   
Additionally to the different financing systems of the universities in Europe we present 
some good samples of the administration and funding of the primary and secondary 
schools. Since 1814 the right of a seven-year education has existed in Denmark and the 
institution of a comprehensive school (Folkeskole) is therefore even older than the first 
Danish constitution of 1849. Today the Folkeskole is a municipal matter and the central 
ministry of education fixes only the minim number of teaching hours per pupil or the 
general goal of the curriculum and publishes curriculum guidelines for the individual 
subjects. The published curriculum guidelines are recommendations and as such are not 
mandatory as long as the general goals of the curriculum are not undermined. For this 
reason each Danish municipality is responsible for all elements of the Folkeskole like 
planning and the establishment of the school, hire and fire of the teachers as well as the 
school head, the size of a class and the number of teaching hours. The municipalities 
themselves are able to delegate some of the decisions or even all decisions regarding the 
local Folkeskole to elected school boards (Skolebestyrelse). The school boards are 
elected bodies consisting of the pupil, the parents of the pupils and the school head. The 
pupils are elected for one school year and the parents, who have the majority of seats of 
the school board, have a legislative period of four years. The school board decides about 
the textbooks, the distribution of the school budget funded by a block grant by the 
municipalities and, if the municipalities have delegated this right, about the class size, 
number of teaching hours and the teacher selection as well as the teacher salary.  
Furthermore, in Denmark a transparent regulation of funding of primary and secondary 
private schools exists. Parents are free to decide to send their children instead of a 
public Folkeskole to a private school and the state will cover 80-85 % of the total 
current expenditure cost of the school and the remaining 15-20 % of the current 
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education cost has to paid by the parents themselves. The private school has to be non-
profit orientated and not linked to other private schools. Private schools have to 
generate their own “starting school budget” and construct their school building without 
any public financial support and receive the public funds after the first school year. The 
private schools have to create, like the Folkeskole, school boards on which the parents 
also have the majority of the seats. The majority of the Danish private schools are 
Christian religious schools, Rudolf Steiner schools, German minority schools or 
Muslim
16
 religious schools.   
In England compulsory education from the age of 5 to 16 exists and the majority of the 
primary and secondary schools are comprehensive schools, however in a small number 
of areas a grammar school system also exists. A uniform curriculum, which is divided 
into four “Key Stages”, four nationwide pupils tests, which are externally set and 
marked, and final uniform examinations tests (General Certificate of Secondary 
Education) are further features of the English education system. Due to the standardised 
national examinations it is possible to receive a good measurement of the education 
output in England as well as of each individual school. Especially the school 
performance – since 1992 published by the so-called “League tables” – are a well 
known indicator for the parents to compare the school of their children and for the 
teacher to compare their effort and results with similar schools.  
The Education Reform Act of 1988 introduced a “market type mechanism” 
(Glennerster, 1991, page 1268), because – besides the introduction of the uniform 
examination test and the establishment of a new type of school
17
 – the parents receive 
an increasing choice of the schools to which the parents can send their children. The 
reform process was concluded by the fact that the schools were funded mainly by the 
number of enrolled pupils, the school has to accept new pupils until they receive the 
capacity limit and the school boards receive more responsibility from the local 
authorities.   
Under the aspect of strengthening accountability, the Education Reform Act of 1988 is 
reasonable, because the consumers of education are able to make their decision on the 
basis of better information, the providers of education have an incentive to attract more 
consumers and the bureaucrats and the politicians have decentralised the daily business 
of the school to a school board and can develop general goals for a uniform curriculum.  
 
CONCLUSIONS 
During the last few years, countless studies have looked at decentralisation trends 
worldwide and at the practical implementation for the public sector. Many studies have 
analysed the impact of fiscal federalism on the size of government (for a good overview 
see Feld, Kirchgässner and Schaltegger, 2003) or observed the impact of 
decentralization on economic growth (see, e.g., Davoodi / Zou, 1998) and stability (for 
example, Fukasaku and de Mello (1998) and Prud’homme, 1995). Recent studies have 
also investigated the relationship between decentralisation of government activities and 
corruption (Treisman, 2000; Tanzi, 2000; Fisman and Gatti, 2002), democratic 
participation (Huther / Shah, 1998) or tax morale (Torgler / Werner, 2005). However, in 
many areas the empirical evidence is mixed, which indicates the relevance to present 
more empirical results.  
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The goal of this article was to provide a brief overview of different forms and 
arrangements of public administration in the education sector in ten European countries 
and how the educational costs are considered in the respective transfer and grant system. 
Moreover, the article has tried to classify the different conceptions and regulations, 
present the current reform process in every country and point out the strengths and 
weaknesses education system. 
However, the author does not suggest that any of the ten European systems is the 
“unique golden example” for other industrialised or developing countries at all, because 
it is obvious that the phrases “one size fits all” is quite redundant. For example, a 
developing county the benefits of a detailed expenditure needs equalisation system like 
in the Nordic countries could be lower if the intensive cost to provide and prepare the 
necessary statistical data is borne in mind. Also, the reasonable horizontal education 
equalisation system between the Swiss cantons in University financing (see Werner, 
2008) to reduce the spillover effect can develop its full successful impact only in a 
country which has a high subnational tax sovereignty and direct democracy options. 
Furthermore, a university building planning commission like for example in Germany 
needs a political background, which is described by Spahn and Franz quite skilfully as 
“Consensus Democracy and Interjurisdictional Fiscal Solidarity” (Spahn / Franz, 2002, 
page 122).  
Nevertheless, the presented European transfer systems and their impact on the education 
system can be used as a spin-off for various sectors of fiscal reforms. Therefore, it will 
be interesting to observe whether fiscal federalism reform tendencies in the mentioned 
ten European countries will have an impact on education in Europe in the future. 
 
Jan Werner, Institute of Local Public Finance, Schumannstraße 29, 63225 Langen, 
Germany, jan.werner@ilpf.de & Business and Information Technology School, 
Reiterweg 26, 58636 Iserlohn, Germany, jan.werner@bits-iserlohn.de   
 
NOTES
                                                 
1
 Jan Werner, Institute of Local Public Finance, Schumannstraße 29, 63225 Langen, 
Germany, email: jan.werner@ilpf.de. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions 
expressed in this paper rare entirely those of the author. They do not necessarily 
represent the view of the ILPF or the BITS Iserlohn. An earlier and broader version of 
this paper exists as ILPF working paper 02-2006. 
2
 The classification is mainly adapted by Winkler, 1989 page 5-11; Winkler 1994, page 
19 as well as Gersherg and Winkler, 2003, page 2-7. 
3
 Spain can be placed into this group as well, because the delivery of educational 
services is mainly the responsibility of the seventeen Autonomous Communities. The 
Autonomous Communities also regulate school programmes beyond the minimum 
structure and content determined by the State. However, how important such minimum 
structure could be politically developed, can be observed in the bilingual education in 
Catalan and Spanish in the Autonomous Community of Catalonia, which is one 
example of the famous pork barreling politics in Spain. Moreover, the university 
education in Spain is regulated by the State through the Ministry of Education and 
Culture and therefore we have decided Spain should not be put into the same class as 
Switzerland and Belgium.  
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4
 In Austria the salaries of the teachers for the primary schools, for one wing of the 
secondary schools  (Hauptschule) and for the polytechnic institutes (Polytechnischen 
Schulen) are completely financed by the central government.  
5
 In Belgium some differences exist between the French, the Flemish and the German 
(speaking) communities. In Belgium the investments in school buildings are financed 
by the upper-local authorities (provinces) or directly by the school, which is itself 
mainly financed by the municipalities. 
6
 In Denmark the costs of primary and secondary schools are borne by the 
municipalities or directly by the respective school, which has a global budget financed 
by the municipalities.  
7
 In some German states the municipalities instead of the upper-local authorities 
(Landkreise) are responsible for the maintenance and construction of new primary 
schools. 
8
 In Italy the teachers of the primary and secondary schools are civil servants of the 
central government and the level of the teacher salaries is mostly equal in Italy. 
However, in some tiers of government with a highly autonomous status, like the 
province of Bozen-Southern Tyrol, the administration of the teachers is enforced by 
upper-local administrations. Moreover, the province of Bozen-Southern Tyrol, with its 
own laws and different salary brackets, can offer its teachers higher salaries. These 
higher salary brackets are necessary, because the pupils are sometimes educated in a 
trilingual manner (German, Italian and Ladin). Furthermore, the central government and 
the province of Bozen-Southern Tyrol have also arranged special treatments for the 
University of Bozen.   
9
 The Danish Evaluation Institute (EVA) evaluates the teachers as well as the schools at 
all levels of the education system. EVA is a self-governing institution, which conducts 
evaluations both on its own initiative and upon request from the central ministry of 
education, local authorities or the school boards.  
10
 In France exists 30 académies each headed by a rector, which is fully responsible on 
behalf of the central minister of education. A single académie observes the schools of 
several département..  
11
 The National Institute for the Evaluation of the Education and Training System 
(INVALSI) conduct the nationwide evaluation of the school and the respective pupils 
performance of the schools.  
12
 The National Agency for Education (NAE) evaluate s and supervises the public 
school system in Sweden. Every year, the National Agency for Education presents a 
current overview of the school system to the central government as well as to the 
Swedish parliament. These reports are the basic of a national development plan for 
schools. The NAE ensures that the provisions of the Education Act are being complied 
with and that the rights of the individual student are respected.  
13
 Ofsted conducts the evaluation of the schools in  England and is a non-ministerial 
government department accountable to Parliament. The counterpart of Ofsted is in 
Wales the Estyn and in Northern Irland the ETI. 
14
 However, it has to be borne in mind that this feature is only one of the four 
components of the complete taximeter model. 
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15
 In 2007 the DFG has a budget of  € 1.7321billion and is funded by 62 % by the 
central government and by 36 % by the 16 federal states.   
16
 The majority of the Moslem immigrants – mainly from Turkey – prefer to attend the 
public comprehensive schools and the immigrants in Denmark are included in the daily 
school lives more than in France or Germany.   
17
 A detailed description of the Grant Maintained schools can be found in Clark, 2005. 
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